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RETHINKING INFORMATION PRIVACY IN AN
AGE OF ONLINE TRANSPARENCY
Robert Sprague*

INTRODUCTION

Wikipedia Foundation's Ex-Chief Operating Officer Has a
CriminalRecord.' The type of headline every employer dreads seeing in
the newspaper. Carolyn Bothwell Doran had been promoted from a parttime bookkeeper for the Wikimedia Foundation (the foundation that runs
and accepts donations for the online encyclopedia, Wikipedia) and spent
six months as chief operating officer, responsible for personnel and
financial management.2 But, the Wikimedia Foundation had failed to
run a rudimentary background check-if it had, it would have
discovered that Doran had spent time in prison for a hit-and-run
accident, had multiple drunken-driving convictions, and had run-ins with
authorities for theft, writing bad checks, and wounding her boyfriend
with a gunshot to the chest. 3 No wonder employers have begun turning
to the Internet as a source ofjob applicant pre-screening.4
I.

ONLINE TRANSPARENCY

The Internet has changed dramatically since its inception in the
1960s (as an information sharing network used by the military,
scientists, and academics), and since it was opened to the public in the
mid-1990s. 5 The Internet, and more specifically, the World Wide Web,
* J.D., M.B.A., Assistant Professor, University of Wyoming College of Business, Department of
Management and Marketing.
1. See Brian Bergstein, Wiki Officer's Sketchy History, MERCURY NEWS, Dec. 22, 2007,
http://www.mercurynews.com/business/ci-7786536.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. See, e.g., Ellen Nakashima, Harsh Words Die Hard on the Web, WASH. POST, Mar. 7,
2007, at Al.
5. See Barry M. Leiner et al., A Brief History of the Internet, Dec. 10, 2003,
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is where more and more people first turn for news, 6 entertainment, 7 and
commerce. 8 Particularly, the information sharing nature of the Internet
has thrived in the first decade of the Twenty-first century. There are over
seventy million online Web logs (known as "blogs") 9 chronicling every
conceivable topic, many with the capability for readers to post
comments to entries. Together, the two most popular social networking
sites, MySpace and Facebook, which allow users to create online
profiles and share information, photos, and videos with other users,
boast nearly 100 million users. 10
Between blogs and social networking sites, a staggering amount of
personal information is being published online.11 For a new generation,
both authenticity and reputation come from online exposure. 12 "People
are not just findable, they are knowable." 1 3 And even those who do not
wish to actively participate online still leave "digital footprints."' 4 The
digitization of public records, combined with the increasing accuracy of
search engines, has made it easier for the general population-including
prospective employers-to join creditors, law enforcement, and
professional investigators to discover individuals' personal data. 15
A generation is emerging whose members post their opinions and

http://www.isoc.org/intemet/history/brief.shtml.
6. See, e.g., JOHN B. HORRIGAN, PEW INTERNET & AM. LIFE PROJECT, ONLINE NEWS: FOR
MANY HOME BROADBAND USERS, THE INTERNET IS A PRIMARY NEWS SOURCE (2006), available at

http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPNews.and.Broadband.pdf (noting that, in a typical day by the
end of 2005, 50 million Americans got news online).
7. The Writers Guild of America strike that began in late 2007 centered principally on how
much writers should be paid when their work is distributed digitally for viewing on computers. See
Sarah McBride & Rebecca Dana, Scenes From Next Week... ?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 2007, at B 1.
8. "Cyber Monday" has entered the lexicon, describing the Monday after Thanksgiving
when employees use their employers' high-speed Intemet access to conduct their online holiday
shopping. See Mylene Mangalindan, 'Cyber Monday' Sets Record For Retail Sales on the Web,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2007, at B2.

9. Posting of David Sifry to Sifry's Alerts: The State of the Live Web,
http://www.sifTy.com/alerts/archives/000493.html (Apr. 5, 2007) (recording over 70 million blogs
as of April 2007, with some 120,000 new blogs created every day).
10. See Brad Stone, Facebook Goes Off the Campus, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2007, at C2.
11. DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE FUTURE OF REPUTATION: GOSSIP, RUMOR, AND PRIVACY ON THE
INTERNET 29 (2007).

12. See Clive Thompson, The See-Through CEO, WIRED, Apr. 2007, at 136-38; See generally
SOLOVE, supra note 11.
13. MARRY MADDEN ET AL., DIGITAL FOOTPRINTS: ONLINE IDENTITY MANAGEMENT AND
SEARCH IN THE AGE OF TRANSPARENCY, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT 4 (Dec. 16,

2007), available at http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIPDigital-Footprints.pdf.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 3.
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live their daily lives online.' 6 Virtual environments originated within
subsets of society, with their own ethos developed by largely
anonymous, tech-savvy insiders. 7 Online social networking has now
gone mainstream. While many foundations of the virtual world still
exist-unbridled conversations, baring souls online, presumed
anonymity-the virtual world is also now more scrutinized by third
parties who do not necessarily share "the Net culture's free-wheeling
values."'18 Additionally, what may be merely posturing in front of online
friends, can be viewed and taken seriously by an "outsider," such as a
prospective employer.' 9 "Poorly chosen words," or a photograph
published online, could have career-altering consequences.2 °

II. EMPLOYMENT PRE-SCREENING
Employers are not just worried about embarrassing publicity when
an employee's, checkered past becomes a news item. 2' Surveys have
16. See David Rosenblum, What Anyone Can Know: The Privacy Risks of Social Networking
Sites, 5 IEEE SECURITY & PRIVACY 40, 40 (May/June 2007), available at
http://csdl.computer.org/dl/mags/sp/2007/03/j3040.pdf.
17. Id.at 40-41.
18. Id. at 41. See also Nancy Hass, In Your Facebook.com, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2006, § 4A
(discussing a "Facebook war" between college students and campus police, in which students
"caught" campus police monitoring student Facebook pages when students posted notices of a fake
party that police responded to); Jared Miller, UW Lifts
Student Suspensions, CASPER STARTRIBUNE,
Dec.
11,
2007,
http://www.trib.com/articles/2007/12/1 1/news/wyoming/ab8O5643dafc47b2872573ae00063d63.txt
(discussing the suspension of four University of Wyoming students in response to pictures from a
fraternity party posted on one of the student's Facebook page); Libby Sander, New Software to
Monitor Athletes' Web Sites Troubles Legal Experts, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Jan. 14, 2008,
http://chronicle.com/daily/2008/01/1210n.htm
(analyzing YouDiligence, a "social-network
monitoring service" being marketed to college athletics departments which promises to search
Facebook and MySpace for up to 500 objectionable words and phrases ranging from profanity to
slang used to describe drug use).
19. See, e.g., Alan Finder, When a Risqud Online Persona Undermines a Chancefor a Job,
N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2006, at 1 (discussing the ramifications of a job applicant's Facebook page
describing his interests as "smokin' blunts," shooting people, and obsessive sex). Online postings
can also be taken out of context, resulting in serious consequences. See, e.g., Andy Guess, Inside
Higher Ed, Maybe He Shouldn't Have Spoken His Mind (Jan. 11, 2008),
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/01/1 1. The blog discusses a Valdosta State University
sophomore who was administratively withdrawn because he presented a "clear and present danger
to [the] campus" based on a posting on his Facebook page entitled, "Shoot it. Upload it. Get
Famous. Project Spotlight is searching for the next big thing. Are you it?" However, the university
administration failed to read the words in their proper context. "Shoot it" merely referred to an
online digital video contest. Id.
20. See, e.g., Randall Stross, How to Lose Your Job on Your Own Time, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30,
2007, § 3, at 3.
21. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3. See also Peter Elkind, Can This Man Save
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indicated that nearly half of job applicants lie about their work history
and education. 22 Employers also seek to find individuals who will work
and perform well within the organization. 3 The Internet provides a
potential, and tempting, treasure trove of information about prospective
employees.
Indeed, an employer may even argue that it is legally obligated to
Google its job applicants.24 The doctrine of negligent hiring has evolved
to impose liability on employers in certain situations where third parties
are harmed as the result of conduct by an employee, even where the
employee was acting outside the scope of employment.25 The modem
application of the negligent hiring theory imposes liability on an
employer when it "places an unfit person in an employment situation
that entails an unreasonable risk of harm to others., 26 "[A]n employer
owes a duty of reasonable care to third persons in the hiring and
retention of employees whose aggressive or reckless characteristics or
lack of competence in the performance of their employment duties may
endanger such third persons., 27 This duty requires that employers
investigate employment candidates. 28 "Negligent hiring occurs when,
prior to the time the employee is actually hired, the employer knew or
should have known of the employee's unfitness, and the issue of liability
primarily focuses upon the adequacy of the employer's pre-employment
investigation into the employee's background. 2 9
A negligent hiring claim will arise where there is actual injury to a

RadioShack?,
FORTUNE,
Mar.
13,
2007,
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune-archive/2007/03/l 9/8402335/index.htm
(recounting that RadioShack's former CEO, David Edmondson, resigned following a local
newspaper report that he had been arrested for drunk driving and had fabricated his bachelor's
degree).
22. See Inst. of Mgmt. & Admin., How to Ferret Out Instances of Rdsumd Padding and
Fraud, COMPENSATION & BENEFITS FOR L. OFFICES, 3, 5 (June 2006).

23. See Chris Piotrowski & Terry Armstrong, Current Recruitment and Selection Practices: A
National Survey ofFortune 1000 Firms, 8 N. AM. J.PSYCHOL. 489, 489 (2006).
24. "Googling" is derived from the Internet search site, http://www.google.com, operated by
Google, Inc. "To google," has entered the English lexicon as a verb describing the act of searching
the Internet for a person, place, event, story, or document. Thus, Googling someone refers to
searching the Internet for information about that person.
25. Rodolfo A. Camacho, How to Avoid Negligent Hiring Litigation, 14 WHITTIER L. REV.
787, 790 (1993).
26. Rosanne Lienhard, Negligent Retention of Employees: An Expanding Doctrine, 63 DEF.
COUNS. J.389, 389 (1996).
27. Di Cosala v. Kay, 450 A.2d 508, 510 (N.J. 1982).
28. Garcia v. Duffy, 492 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
29. Id. (citing Williams v. Feathersound, Inc., 386 So. 2d 1238 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980),
petition for review denied, 392 So. 2d 1374 (Fla. 1981).
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third party which could have been prevented had the employer not put
the employee in a position to cause that harm.30 For example, the owner
of an apartment complex should not give a master key to an employee
when a background check would have revealed that the employee had a
criminal record.3 1
While employers use pre-screening techniques (such as personality
tests and background checks)32 to weed out undesirable candidates, they
also use them to help identify candidates who possess desirable traits.33
In this regard, because employers are most likely not going to receive
any substantive information about an applicant from his references, they
may be compelled to search the Internet to gather information about the
applicant's character traits.34 Employers perform background checks
and review employment histories of applicants based on the notion that
"past performance is the best predictor of future behavior., 35 However,
former employers fear defamation suits from past employees arising
from references, 36 despite a legal environment described by Finkin as
"hospitable to the free exchange of information about prospective
employees .

.

. ,3'

Googling job applicants offers a compelling

substitute for references, as a search is more likely to reveal (snippets of)
the character of the applicant.
Traditional, pre-screening techniques are also severely restricted by
various laws. For example, an employer may not ask questions which
would allow the employer to screen applicants based on a protected class
(race, color, national origin, religion, or gender) under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964.38 Employers also face legal restrictions in the
30. See Ponticas v. K.M.S. Invs., 331 N.W.2d 907, 910 (Minn. 1983).
31. See, e.g., id. at 909. The employer, an owner of an apartment building, was held liable for
the rape of a tenant by the manager on the theory of negligent hiring. The employer hired the
manager, and therefore, had the duty to exercise reasonable care when hiring individuals who
possess job duties that may impose a threat of injury to members of public. Id.
32. See Piotrowski & Armstrong, supra note 23, at 492.
33. See Ann Marie Ryan & Marja Lasek, Negligent Hiring and Defamation. Areas of
Liability Related to Pre-Employment Inquiries, 44 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL. 293, 304 (1991).
34. See id.
35. Id. at 293 (citation omitted).
36. Matthew W. Finkin, From Anonymity to Transparence:Screening the Workforce in the
Information Age, 2000 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 403, 422 (2000).
37. Id. See generally Ramona L. Paetzold & Steven L. Willbom, Employer (Ir) Rationality
and the Demise of Employment References, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 123, 136-37 (1992) (analyzing survey
results indicating the relative frequency of reference-based defamation litigation probably has not
increased, that defamation law still privileges employers so that (former) employees seldom win any
award, and that the size of awards has declined over time).
38. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2007). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1605.3 (2007) (regulating selection
practices that discriminate on the basis of religion); 29 C.F.R. § 1606.6 (2007) (regulating selection
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use of ability, integrity, and personality tests. 39 The use of any selection
procedure, which has an adverse impact on the hiring, promotion, or
other employment opportunities of members of any race, sex, or ethnic
group, will be considered to be discriminatory unless the procedure has
been validated in accordance with EEOC guidelines.4 °
If employers wish to check the credit history of an applicant, the
Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) requires the employer to notify the
applicant in writing if a report is to be obtained, 4 1 and employers must
notify an applicant if a credit report is used in making an adverse
decision (such as deciding not to hire the applicant).42 An employer
cannot use worker compensation claims information before an offer of
employment is made because the Americans with Disabilities Act
prohibits employers from inquiring whether an applicant has a
disability. 43 In addition, the Bankruptcy Act prohibits employers from
discriminating "with respect to employment" against an individual who
is seeking
or has sought bankruptcy protection under the Bankruptcy
4
Act.

4

III.

PRIVACY IN THE UNITED STATES

For the most part, restrictions on applicant pre-screening have more
to do with preventing discrimination than protecting the privacy of

practices that discriminate on the basis of national origin); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.7 (2007) (regulating
pre-employment inquiries as to sex); State ex rel. McClure v. Sports & Health Club, Inc., 370
N.W.2d 844, 849-50 (Minn. 1985) (discussing discrimination based on "religious beliefs, or lack
thereof'). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") has issued guidelines for
employers with suggestions as to what are permissible and impermissible employment application
and interview questions under Title VII. EEOC Guide to Pre-Employment Inquiries, 8A [Fair
Employment Practices Manual] LABOR REL. REP. (BNA) No. 695, at 443:65-66 (2002). Similarly,
the EEOC has issued guidelines for employers with suggestions as to what are permissible and
impermissible employment application and interview questions under the Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA). 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-117) (2003); EEOC: Enforcement Guidance on PreEmployment Inquiries Under the Americans With Disabilities Act, 8 [Fair Employment Practices
Manual] LABOR REL. REP. (BNA) No. 783, at 405:7191-202 (1995).
39. 29 C.F.R. § 1607 (2007). The EEOC has issued guidelines in the use of pre-employment
tests as a selection procedure. Id.
40. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.3(A). The guidelines essentially require that the selection procedure be
linked to attributes of successful job performance. Id. § 1607.5(B).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 1681d(a)(2000).
42. Id. § 1681 m(a).
43. Benjamin Belcher et al., The Regulation of Employee Information in the United States, 21
COMP. LAB. L. & POL'Y J. 787, 802-03 (2000).
44. 11 U.S.C. § 525(b) (2000). See also Belcher et al., supra note 43, at 804 (discussing
restrictions on prospective employers' use of wage garnishment records).
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applicants. As a general matter, courts will respect the privacy of job
applicants in situations in which the prospective employer pries too
deeply-beyond any legitimate business purpose-into applicants'
personal lives.45 The manner in which the right to privacy in the United

States has developed, however, affords essentially no protection for
applicants when prospective employers turn to the Internet to investigate
their thoughts, musings, recreations, or even what others may have said
about them online.
A. The Civil Right to Privacy
The origins of privacy protection in the United States date back to
1890, when Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published their seminal
46
work, The Right to Privacy, recognizing a "right to be let alone[,]"
enforceable through legal protection from "injurious disclosures as to
private matters. 47 Legend has it that the impetus for The Right to
Privacy was Warren's dismay after reading about his own daughter's
wedding being reported in the newspaper.48 In particular, Warren and

Brandeis expressed concern not only over the aggressive activities of the
press, but their accompanying technology as well. 49 They argued for "a
principle which may be invoked to protect the privacy of the individual
from invasion either by the too enterprising press, the photographer, or

the possessor of any other modem device for recording or reproducing

45. See, e.g., Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192, 1196-97 (Il. App. Ct. 2000)
(denying employer's motion for summary judgment for invasion of privacy claim by employees
who were subjects of reports by undercover investigators which contained personal information
unrelated to workplace); Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., I Cal. Rptr. 2d 77, 86 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (holding that questions regarding applicants' religious beliefs and sexual orientation in a 704question psychological test were not job-related and therefore invaded applicants' privacy).
46. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193
(1890). See also James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193
(1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 877 (1979) (noting courts
and commentators have deemed The Right to Privacy to be the underpinning of the foundation for
tortious claims of invasion of privacy).
47. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 46, at 204-05.
48. See William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 383 (1960) (reporting that in a city
and an era "in which a lady and a gentleman kept their names and their personal affairs out of the
papers[," Warren became annoyed "when the newspapers had a field day on the occasion of the
wedding of a daughter .... ). But see Barron, supra note 46, at 893 (noting that Warren's first
daughter was only six years old in 1890, and speculating the newspaper story in question may have
covered the wedding of one of Mrs. Warren's cousins). See generallyNeil M. Richards & Daniel J.
Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of Confidentiality,96 GEO. L.J. 123, 128 (2007)
(discussing that there were "social privacy" invasions into the lives of families similar to Warren's).
49. Warren & Brandeis, supranote 46, at 206.
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scenes or sounds., 50
"Instantaneous photographs and newspaper
enterprise have invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life;
and numerous mechanical devices threaten to make good the prediction
that 'what
is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from the house5
tops."
But to create a legal protection from public invasions of privacy,
Warren and Brandeis shifted the privacy argument in the United States
from an already established body of law that protected privacy as
confidentiality. 52 A confidential relationship requires just that-a
relationship (either through contract, trust, or both).53 Warren and
Brandeis noted, for example, that the photographic arts once required the
subject to "sit" for a portrait; therefore, the law of contract or trust would
protect against improper circulation of the portrait. 54 But by the late
1800's,
instantaneous
photography allowed
for surreptitious
photographs, eliminating any sort of relationship between the
photographer and the subject. 55 Coupled with an expanding press,
Warren and Brandeis were most concerned with a law that would
prevent "injurious disclosures as to private matters" in circumstances
where there was no relationship between the parties.56 For Warren and
Brandeis, this type of privacy did not arise "from
contract or from
57
world.,
the
against
as
rights
are
but
trust,
special
By the mid-Twentieth century, based in large part on Warren and
Brandeis's The Right to Privacy, the majority of states recognized a civil
right to privacy. 58 In 1960, Prosser identified four distinct types of
invasion of privacy recognized by the courts: (1) intrusion upon
seclusion, (2) public disclosure of embarrassing private facts, (3)
publicity which places a person in a false light in the public eye, and (4)
commercial appropriation of a person's name or likeness. 59 But an
additional requirement had become ingrained in the first three types of
invasion of privacy: highly offensive conduct.
Perhaps the tone was originally set in what is generally considered
the first reported case recognizing a right to privacy. In De May v.

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.

Id.
Id.at 195.
See Richards & Solove, supra note 48, at 127.
See id. at 132.
See Warren & Brandeis, supranote 46, at 211.
See id.
Id. at 204.
Id. at 213.
See Prosser, supra note 48, at 386.
Id. at 389.
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Roberts,60 a man had impersonated a doctor in order to be present when
a woman gave birth.6 1 Given circumstances approximating an intrusion
upon seclusion, the De May court acknowledged the woman's right to
privacy during "a most sacred" occasion, ruling "[i]t would be shocking
to our sense of right, justice and propriety to doubt even but that for such
an act the law would afford an ample remedy. 62 Or perhaps it was set
by Warren and Brandeis when they limited protection to "those persons
with whose affairs the community has no legitimate concern," to prevent
them "from being dragged into an undesirable and undesired publicity..64
v. Reid
. .,63 This tone was also reflected in the later case of Melvin
(involving public disclosure of private facts), in which a former
prostitute and murder defendant, who had abandoned her "life of
shame," married and led a life in a "respectable society.

'65

The

community, unaware of her past, was forced to face the publication of
these facts.66 The California Court of Appeal held that the publication
"of the unsavory incidents in the past life of [the woman] after she had
reformed, coupled with her true name, was not justified by any standard
of morals or ethics known to" the court.67
The modem application of intrusion upon seclusion occurs when
someone "intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs ....

if the intrusion

would be highly offensive to a reasonable person., 68 In the employment
context, employers have generally been found to invade the privacy of
employees only in the most extreme circumstances, such as prying-in
detail-about an employee's sex life.69 In one instance, a court found
that an employer may have invaded the privacy of employees regarding
non-work related information, based on how the employer collected the

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.

9 N.W. 146 (Mich. 1881).
Id. at 146.
Id. at 148-49.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 46, at 214.
297 P. 91 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1931).
Id. at 91.

66. Id.
67. Id. at 93.
68.
69.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
Compare Phillips v. Smalley Maint. Servs., 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983) (finding an

intrusion upon employee's private activities based on employer's repeated inquiries into employee's
sex life), with Morenz v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. 79979, 2002 WL 1041760, at *2-4 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 23, 2002) (finding no intrusion upon employee's private activities where employer asked
employee if he was gay because the purpose of the question, asked in private, was merely to

ascertain employee's job satisfaction and comfort living in the south).
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information.7 ° In Johnson v. K Mart Corp.,7 1 the employer had hired
private detectives to investigate employees regarding instances of theft,
vandalism, sabotage, and potential drug use.72 The investigators, posing
as employees, submitted reports detailing their conversations with
employees, which included information regarding the employees' family
problems, health problems, and sex lives.73 The court denied the
employer's motion for summary judgment, holding there was a material
issue of fact whether the employer's conduct-allowing the investigators
to continue to collect personal information which had no legitimate
business purpose-was offensive.74 Of course, the circumstances would
be different if the employer learned the same type of information about
an employee based on information the employee published on the
Internet.75
The publication of private facts is an invasion of privacy "if the
matter publicized is of a kind that (a) would be highly offensive to a
76
reasonable person, and (b) is not of legitimate concern to the public.,
This type of invasion recognizes the difference between a "shrinking
soul who is abnormally sensitive about . . . publicity" and "details of
sexual relations spread before the public gaze," or highly personal
portrayals of intimate private conduct.7 7 Indeed, Prosser speculates that
as this type of invasion has developed, Warren would not have had an
actionable claim of invasion of privacy regarding the newspaper
accounts which gave rise to his co-authoring The Right to Privacy.78
Finally, false light invasion of privacy is not actionable unless "the false
light in which the other was placed would be highly offensive to a
79
reasonable person.,
U.S. privacy law is based on a paradigm that understands privacy

70. See, e.g., Johnson v. K Mart Corp., 723 N.E.2d 1192 (Ill. App. Ct. 2000).
71. Id.
72. See id. at 1194.
73. Seeid. at 1196.
74. See id. at 1197.
75. See, e.g., Robyn v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 774 F. Supp. 587, 592-93 (D. Colo. 1991)
(holding that employee did not have a cause of action for an invasion of privacy, based on the
presence in her personnel file of her bank statement and certain diary entries communicated to her
psychiatrist, because there was no evidence employer had improperly obtained the information).
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).
77. Prosser, supra note 48, at 397.
78. See id.
79. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977). The fourth type of invasion, the
commercial appropriation of a person's name or likeness, applies when "appropriates to his own use
or benefit the name or likeness of another." Id. § 652C.
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problems as highly offensive invasions into a person's hidden world.80
This leaves little room for any notion of privacy relating to information a
person self-publishes on the Internet, whether in a social networking
profile or a blog.
B. ConstitutionalRight to Privacy
The constitutional right of privacy is derived from the Fourth
Amendment, which creates "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures ....,,8 Since the Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable
searches and seizures, in determining whether there has been an invasion
of this constitutional right to privacy, the Supreme Court examines
whether an individual has a subjective expectation of privacy, reasonable
under the given circumstances.82
For example, when authorities, without a warrant, used an
electronic tracking device inside a container of chemicals to track that
container during its travels over the road, the Supreme Court found no
violation of the Fourth Amendment. 83 The Court believed the agents
obtained no more information than they would have through physical
surveillance, concluding that "[a] person traveling in an automobile on
public thoroughfares has no reasonable expectation of privacy in his
movements from one place to another., 8 4 In more general terms, the
Court's attitude is that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public,
even in his 8own
home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment
5
protection.
80. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REv. 1393, 1431 (2001).
81. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. Warrants authorizing a search or seizure must be based on
probable cause and must describe with particularity the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized. Id. The Fourth Amendment applies to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 714 (1987). The Fourth Amendment regulates
conduct by the state, and therefore, it applies to public employers. Id. While the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to private employers, in many respects its application parallels private
rights of privacy. See id. at 715.
82. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
361 (1967)).
83. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 285 (1983).
84. Id. at 281. But see United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (holding a warrant
was required under the Fourth Amendment when authorities used an electronic tracking device to
track a container after it was located inside a suspect's home). "[P]rivate residences are places in
which the individual normally expects privacy free of governmental intrusion not authorized by a
warrant, and that expectation is plainly one that society is prepared to recognize as justifiable." Id.
85. Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (1967) (citing Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966);
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C. PrivacyEquals Secrecy

Privacy protection in America, whether civil or constitutional,
focuses on keeping information secret. But keeping information secret is
difficult because U.S. law has taken an "opt-out" approach regarding
privacy. 8 6 In other words, failing to take affirmative steps to prevent

disclosure of information (i.e., to keep it secret) equates to implied
consent for the publication and dissemination of that information. 87 This
appears to be the approach taken by courts regarding warrantless
searches. For example, in U.S. v. Barrows,88 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals concluded that an employee who connected his personal

computer (in a public work area) to his employer's computer network
which allowed file sharing, left the computer running, and did not
password-protect any files, had no expectation of privacy in any files
observed by co-workers. 89 The court ruled that while the employee may
have had "a subjective expectation of privacy, his failure to take

affirmative measures to limit other employees' access makes that
expectation unreasonable. 9 °
Similarly, in Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania v. Sodomsky, 91 the Superior Court of Pennsylvania found

United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559, 563 (1927)).
86. See, e.g.,
15 U.S.C. § 6802(b) (2000); see also Solove, supra note 80, at 1458 (describing
how the default rule for an "opt out" system allows "personal data [to] be collected and used unless
the individual expressly states a preference not to have information collected or used").
[Flinancial institution[s] may not disclose nonpublic personal information to a
nonaffiliated third party unless- (A) [the] institution[s] clearly and conspicuously
disclose[] to the consumer ...that such information may be disclosed to such third
party; (B) the consumer is given the opportunity, before the time that such information is
initially disclosed, to direct that such information not be disclosed to such third party...
§ 6802(b)(1). "[Nionpublic personal information" is defined as personally identifiable financial
information, however obtained by a financial institution (including both the information a consumer
personally provides to a financial institution and the information relating to any transactions with
the institution) that is not otherwise publicly available. § 6809(4)(A)-(B). In other words, financial
institutions may share nonpublic personally identifiable information with third parties unless
consumers take the affirmative step of notifying the institutions to not share the information.
87. See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, A Thousand Words Are Worth a Picture. A Privacy Tort
Response to Consumer Data Profiling,98 NW. U. L. REV. 63, 133 (2003) (noting the argument that
consumers' failure to "opt out" of data collection or sharing may "constitute[] implied consent to the
collection and sharing of personal information").
88. 481 F.3d 1246 (10th Cir. 2007).
89. Id. at 1247, 1249.
90. Id. at 1249 (citing O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 718 (1987); United States v.
Angevine, 281 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2002)). The Barrows court further explained, "[t]hose
who bring personal material into public spaces, making no effort to shield that material from public
view, cannot reasonably expect their personal materials to remain private." Id.
91. 939 A.2d 363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
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no privacy interest in computer files when employees of Circuit City,
while performing routine diagnostic tests to verify whether their
installation of a DVD drive on the appellant's computer was successful,
discovered what appeared to be child pornography video files on the
appellant's computer and notified police. 92 The Sodomsky court ruled
the appellant did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in his
video computer files since he was informed that Circuit City employees
would test the operability of the installed DVD drive and he took no
steps to restrict access to any of his computer's files. 93 Again, reflecting
the "opt-out" attitude, the court summarized what it considered a basic
rule of law regarding privacy: "If a person is aware of, or freely grants to
a third party, potential access to his computer contents, he has
knowingly exposed the contents of his computer to the public and has
lost any reasonable expectation of privacy in those contents., 94 Courts
have also extended this attitude to information published on the Internet:
"[I]t strikes the Court as obvious that a claim to privacy is unavailable to
someone who places information on an indisputably, public medium,
such as the Internet, without taking any measures to protect the
information. 95
The same attitude is reflected in civil protections of privacy.
"Certainly no one can complain when publicity is given to information
about him which he himself leaves open to the public eye ....
Current privacy law suggests that a job applicant who posts
embarrassing or personal information on a blog or within a social
networking site which can be accessed by anyone with an Internet
connection should have no expectation of privacy, and therefore, no
recourse, when that publicly-available information is viewed, and
potentially used, in an employment decision.97

92. Id. at 368.
93. See id. (citing United States v. Barth, 26 F. Supp. 2d. 929, 937 (W.D. Tex. 1998)).
94. Id. at 369-70 (citations omitted).
95. United States v. Gines-Perez, 214 F. Supp. 2d 205, 225 (D.P.R. 2002) (holding that stop
of vehicle was legal where police officer used picture downloaded from the Internet to initially
identify and then follow suspect), vacated,90 F. App'x 3, 4 (1st Cir. 2004).

96. Prosser, supra note 48, at 394.
97. See, e.g., Dexter v. Dexter, No. 2006-P-0051, 2007 WL 1532084, at *6 & n.4 (Ohio Ct.
App. May 25, 2007) (upholding custody for father where mother had posted on her MySpace page,
among other online statements considered by the court, that "she was on a hiatus from using illicit
drugs [during the trial] but that she planned on using drugs in the future .... [Tihese writings were
open to the public view. Thus, she can hardly claim an expectation of privacy regarding these
writings"); Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One's Own: On Privacy and Online Social
Networks, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73, 78 (2007) ("Categorically, everyone would agree that
those who carelessly post shameful pictures of themselves or incriminating information on profiles
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Just as extreme circumstances in the early privacy cases may have
contributed to the added requirement of offensiveness for the tort of
invasion of privacy, 98 extreme facts may have contributed to the binary
notion of privacy-that "private" facts must be hidden, kept secret, and
once they are publicly accessible are no longer private. Recall that the
information discovered in Sodomsky was child pornography, 99 as was
also the case in Barrows.0 0 Courts have denied civil claims of invasion

of privacy against employers in similar circumstances. 0 1 It is arguable
that when facing evidence of child (or other types of) pornography,
courts are reluctant to allow claims of privacy to protect what some in
society consider prurient interests. The classic maxim provides that "bad
facts make bad law."' 0 2 Rights to privacy protections in these cases
stand on their own-they are not conditioned on the content of the
information (i.e., child pornography) that is at risk of disclosure.
This all-or-nothing approach to privacy may be outmoded.10 3 New

forms of communication allow others to view what are intended to be at
least somewhat private conversations. Protecting these conversations
requires an attitudinal shift towards acceptance of the idea that just
because a few people have access to information does not mean it is no
longer private.104 Privacy law will have to adapt to the notion that

that are accessible to everyone on the Internet cannot reasonably claim privacy in their posting.");
Krysten Crawford, Have a Blog, Lose Your Job?, CNN MONEY.COM, Feb. 15, 2005,
http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/14/news/economy/blogging (citing four cases of employees being
fired for what they had posted online, observing that most non-contract employees are at-will,
meaning they can be fired at any point for any or no reason at all without any recourse, and are
therefore extremely vulnerable to such employment actions); Ellen Simonetti, I Was Firedfor
Blogging,
CNET
NEWS.COM,
Dec.
16,
2004,
http://www.news.com/2102-1030_35490836.html?tag-st.util.print ("[T]he official reason for my suspension [and eventual termination]:
'inappropriate' pictures. The unofficial reason (implied through an intimidating interrogation):
blogging.").
98. See supranotes 59-67 and accompanying text.
99. Sodomsky, 939 A.2d at 365-66.
100. United States v. Barrows, 481 F.3d 1246, 1247 (10th Cir. 2007).
101. See, e.g., TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 155, 163-64 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002) (holding employee had no right to privacy in content stored on employer-provided
computer employee was allowed to use at home, including content from sexually-explicit Websites, based in large part on fact employee consented in writing to company policy statement that
allowed for monitoring of computer use).
102. See Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 319 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
103. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE
INFORMATION AGE 143 (2004).

104. Even though information published on the Internet is potentially accessible by millions of
people, from a practical standpoint, only a few people may actually view the information. And that
is often the intent of the publisher of the information. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
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information can still be private even if it is not concealed. °5 Just
because we share confidential information with someone does not mean
it is automatically "public" (i.e., no longer private). U.S. privacy
law
10 6
will have to abandon the attitude that "privacy" means "secret."
As noted above, Warren and Brandeis' The Right to Privacy moved
10 7
U.S. privacy law away from the notion of confidentiality.
Confidentiality allows limited disclosure, while privacy law demands
near-total non-disclosure.10 8 Confidentiality is a better fit for modem
communications in which, for example, social networks are a primary
One method of
venue for social interactions among teens.10 9
communication is to post a message on a social network friend's page or
"wall," (rather than, say, send an e-mail message), the accessibility of
which is controlled by the recipient, not the sender.110 Under current
privacy law, exposing information to the recipient means a loss of
privacy because the sender passes control of the information to the
recipient-the recipient can then expose the information to the world.'
The notion of confidentiality at least recognizes some disclosure of
information without loss of privacy protection."' Strictly speaking,

105. See, e.g., Solove, supra note 103, at 143-45.
106. See Richards & Solove, supra note 48, at 174.
107. See supra notes 51-56 and accompanying text.
108. See Richards & Solove, supra note 48, at 174.
109. See AMANDA LENHART ET AL., TEENS AND SOCIAL MEDIA i (2007),
http://www.pewintemet.org/pdfs/PIP-TeensSocialMediaFinal.pdf ("Some 93% of teens use the
internet, and more of them than ever are treating it as a venue for social interaction ....
").
110. See, e.g., Abril, supra note 97, at 74 ("[Online Social Networking (OSN) profiles] are
linked together by real-world relationships and OSN ties to form a network of 'friends.' Through
these networks of associated profiles, OSN participants can . . . leave notes on their friends' profiles
that are visible by anyone with access to the profile."); MySpace.com, MySpace Safety Tips &
Settings,
http://www.myspace.com/index.cfm?fuseaction=cms.viewpage&placement=safety-pagetips&sspag

e=4 (last visited Feb. 23, 2008) (detailing how to change from the default setting, in which
comments posted to a profile do not have to be approved before appearing). While e-mail continues
to fall into disfavor among young adults as a mode of communication, with only 14% of all teens
sending daily e-mails tofriends, among those who use social networking sites, 84% post messages
to a friend's page or wall to communicate on these sites. LENHART ET AL., supra note 109, at iv,
tbl.6.
111. See, e.g., Garrity v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., No. CIV.A. 00-12143-RWZ, 2002
WL 974676, at *1-2 (D. Mass. 2002) (citing Smyth v. Pillsbury Co., 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa.
1996); McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV, 1999 WL 339015, at *4 (Tex. App.
1999)) (holding plaintiffs could not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in messages they sent
using the defendant company's e-mail system because the messages could have been forwarded to
or accessed by third parties).
112. SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 173 ("[C]onfidentiality involves sharing one's secrets ....
When we tell others intimate information, we expect them to keep it confidential.").
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confidentiality does not extend to fully public disclosures., 13 But it leans
toward the possibility that a person could publish personal information
on their blog or social networking profile, retaining its privacy even
though the information may be available to anyone with an Internet
connection. The intent in publishing the information is often only to
share it with a few friends; the fact that it is widely accessible is an
indirect consequence.1 14 Anyone else's access of that information (such
as a prospective employer) is tantamount to electronic eavesdropping,
and therefore an invasion of privacy. 1 5
Our society already recognizes selective exposure of personal
information. 6 For example, one expects a level of privacy within a
gym's locker room, although it is not completely private, at least as to
the people simultaneously using the locker room. 17 If someone were to
surreptitiously take pictures of others within that locker room, there
would be a strong argument for an invasion of privacy.' 18 In a society in
which substantial numbers of people carry (and use) camera phones and
have the means to post photos and videos on the Internet (through a blog
or social networking profile)-meaning anyone can be a paparazzo and
anyone can be the subject of these citizen paparazzi-notions of what is
private will have to evolve, just as in 1890, to accommodate these new
technologies. 1 9

113. See Richards & Solove, supra note 48, at 181-82.
114. See, e.g., SOLOVE, supra note 1I, at 50-54 (describing a young woman's blog chronicling
her life, including names and detailed descriptions of sexual exploits, "to keep a few of her friends
informed about her escapades," but which became widely known and read); see also Lior Jacob
Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 968-69, 969 n.197
(2005) (equating the vast amount of information on the Internet with noise, allowing private
conversations on the Internet similar to face-to-face conversations remaining private in noisy bars or
restaurants).
115. See Daniel Benoliel, Law, Geography and Cyberspace: The Case of On-Line Territorial
Privacy, 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 125, 182 & n.343 (2005) (discussing methods of
eavesdropping, most notably interception of electronic communications, including e-mail, as
invasions of privacy).
116. See SOLOVE, supra note 11, at 173-74 (discussing confidentiality and the inconsistent
protection it receives in American courts, and giving examples of instances where information is
shared but expected to be kept private).
117. Id. at 167.
118. There are specific laws prohibiting such types of voyeurism. See Marjorie A. Shields,
Annotation, Criminal Prosecution of Video or PhotographicVoyeurism, 120 A.L.R. 5TH 337, 34249 (2004) (discussing several state statutes criminalizing the use of video cameras or photography
as a part of voyeuristic activities that constitute an invasion of privacy and the cases interpreting
them).
119. Thomas L. Friedman, Op-Ed., The Whole World is Watching, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2007,
at A23 (discussing the prevalence of blogs, online social networks and camera cell phones and how
these conditions make everyone both a paparazzo and a public figure); Andrew Jay McClurg,
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PROTECTING LAWFUL CONDUCT FROM EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS

One attitudinal

shift, which also specifically

applies

in an

employment context, is reflected in a number of states which restrict
employers from considering private aspects of applicants' lives in
employment decisions.120 Most of these statutes prohibit discrimination
against employees, as well as applicants, based on tobacco use.

21

A few

of the statutes restrict employment decisions based on the more general

"use of lawful consumable products." 122 These statutes refer to off-site,
off-duty conduct, and are limited to activities which have no
23

employment-related consequences. 1

These laws could potentially restrict, in certain circumstances,
employers' use of Internet searches in making hiring decisions. For

example, in 2006, Stacy Snyder, a twenty-five-year-old senior at
Millersville

University,

was denied her teaching

credential

and

dismissed from the student teaching program after staff members of the
high school she was working at came across a photograph on her
MySpace profile. 124 The photograph in question, captioned "Drunken
Pirate," showed Snyder in a pirate costume and drinking an

Bringing Privacy Law Out of the Closet: A Tort Theory of Liabilityfor Intrusions in Public Places,
73 N.C. L. REV. 989, 990-92 (1995) (pointing out the "no privacy in public" rule, under which there
is little recourse in tort law forintrusions into privacy that occur in public places, and arguing that

such a restrictive view is outdated in the face of"a modem technological society").
120. See Jason Bosch, None of Your Business (Interest): The Argument for Protecting All
Employee Behavior With No Business Impact, 76 S.CAL. L. REV. 639, 654 (2003) (explaining how
these so-called "lifestyle protection laws" generally protect three types of employees, including
employees who use lawful products on their own time as well as employees who engage in lawful
behavior unrelated to their jobs).
121. E.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105(a) (2007) ("It is a discriminatory or unfair
employment practice: .. .(iv) For an employer to require as condition of employment that any
employee or prospective employee use or refrain from using tobacco products outside the course of
his employment ....); see Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You are Not at Work?.
Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct as the Basisfor Adverse Employment Decisions, 6 U. PA. J.
LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 641 n.86 (2004) (listing tobacco-specific statutes from nineteen different

states); see also Bosch, supra note 120, at 654-58 (describing the nature and benefits of "lifestyle
protection laws," including those protecting tobacco users, which are "by far the most widespread of
the various lifestyle protection laws").
122. See, e.g., 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. 55/5(a) (2007); MINN. STAT. § 181.938, subdiv. 2 (2006);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313(2) (2007); NEV. REV. STAT. § 613.333(1) (2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
95-28.2(b) (2006); TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(e) (2005); WIS. STAT. § 111.31(3) (2006).
123. See, e.g.,
Pagnattaro, supra note 121, at 642 (examining the North Carolina statute, which
explicitly disqualifies from protection any use of lawful products that interferes with an employee's
ability to do their job or adversely affects the safety of co-workers).
124. Stross, supra note 20.
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unidentifiable beverage from a plastic cup. 25 It is arguable that an
employer could not refuse to hire someone such as Snyder based on a
similar photo if the employer were located in a state with a statute
prohibiting26 discrimination based on off-duty use of lawful consumable
products.1
However, if a job applicant in one of these states were to argue that
a prospective employer violated the lawful consumable products statute
based on what was said on a blog or a social networking profile-under
the theory that the applicant's use of the blog or social networking
profile (a lawful consumable product) was the basis of the employer's
adverse decision-there is a strong likelihood the argument would fail.
For example, in McGillen v. Plum Creek Timber Co., 127 the plaintiff,
who was employed by the defendant, was fired after he decided to play a
practical joke on his supervisor, who had reported the plaintiff for
sleeping on the job, by placing a classified ad in a local paper for the sale
of a truck, indicating that interested parties should call the supervisor's
home number late at night. 28 The plaintiff claimed his firing violated
Montana's statute because his taking out the ad was a use of a lawful
product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours. 29 The
Montana Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs claim, noting that in
defining "lawful product," the statute "means a product that is legally
consumed, and includes food, beverages, and tobacco."' 30 In other
words, protection only applies for a product "that can literally be
consumed." 131
A few of these "off-duty" statutes (in California, Colorado,
Connecticut, New York, and North Dakota) go beyond just lawful
32
consumable products and protect off-duty conduct in general.

125. Id.
126. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 181.938, subdiv. 2 (2006) (specifically identifying alcohol as a
lawful consumable product).
127. 964 P.2d 18 (Mont. 1998).
128. Id. at 20.
129. Id. at 23 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-903(5) (2007) ("The legal use of a lawful
product . . . is not a legitimate business reason [that would give an employer an opportunity to
dismiss for 'good cause'] ....
"); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 39-2-313(2) (2007) ("[A]n
employer may not refuse to employ . . . an individual . . . because the individual legally uses a
lawful product off the employer's premises during nonworking hours.").
130. McGillen, 964 P.2d at 23-24 (citing § 39-2-313).
131. Pagnattaro, supra note 121, at 645-46 (discussing the McGillen court's interpretation of
§39-2-313).
132. E.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2004) ("It is a discriminatory practice for an
employer to fail or refuse to hire a person; to discharge an employee; or to accord adverse or
unequal treatment ... because of ... participation in lawful activity off the employer's premises
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However, these statutes have been interpreted by the courts infrequently
and, despite their broad language, their actual applications reveal their
limitations.
In California, section 96(k) of the California Labor Code authorizes
the Labor Commissioner to take assignments of "[c]laims for loss of
wages as the result of demotion, suspension, or discharge from
employment for lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours
away from the employer's premises."' 33 A plain reading of California's
"lawful conduct" statute indicates there is no limitation to the type of
lawful conduct protected.134 In Barbee v. Household Automotive
Finance Corp.,13 5 the California Court of Appeal rejected an employee's
claim that his employer violated his (state) constitutional right of privacy
when the employer discharged him as a result of his intimate
relationship with a co-worker. 36 The court concluded that the employee
had no reasonable expectation of privacy as to the relationship once the
employer became aware of it in large part because he was on notice of
the employer's policy discouraging such relationships. 37 The employee
in Barbee claimed that his employer's conduct violated section 96(k)
because the intimate relationship with the co-worker took place during
nonworking hours away from the employer's premises. 138 The court
rejected this claim, holding that section 96(k) "does not set forth an
independent public policy that provides employees with any substantive
rights, but rather, merely establishes a procedure by which the Labor
Commissioner may assert, on behalf of employees, recognized
constitutional rights."' 139 With no expectation of privacy, the employee
had no invasion of privacy claim-and hence no claim-despite the
action involving allegedly lawful conduct occurring during nonworking
hours away from the employer's premises.
Colorado has enacted legislation which also prohibits an employer
from terminating "the employment of any employee due to that

during nonworking hours which is not in direct conflict with the essential business-related interests
of the employer.").
133.
134.
135.

CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2003).
See id.
6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 406 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003).

136. Id. at 408 (citing CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; § 96(k)). See generally CAL. CONST. art. I, § I
(guaranteeing privacy as an inalienable right). California's constitutional privacy provision applies
to actions against both private and governmental parties. Barbee, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 409-10 (quoting
Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 644 (Cal. 1994)).
137. Barbee, 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 412 (citing Hill, 865 P.2d at 655).

138. See id. at 412 (citing § 96(k)).
139.

Id.
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employee's engaging in any lawful activity off the premises of the
employer during nonworking hours .... ,,140 However, Colorado's
"lawful activity" restriction does not apply if the activity "[r]elates to a
bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally
related to the employment activities and responsibilities of a particular
employee ...."41 Therefore, in Marsh v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 142 the

U.S. District Court ruled that an employer did not violate Colorado's
statute when it dismissed an employee who had written a letter critical of
management that was published in a newspaper.1 43 The court held that
the employee owed his employer a duty of loyalty, which the employee
breached by trying to settle publicly a private dispute with
management. 144
Connecticut's "off-duty" statute is limited to protecting employees
who exercise state or federal first amendment rights. 145 At least as
applied to free speech rights, courts have limited application of
146
Connecticut's statute to speech relating to matters of public concern, 147
and "internal employment policies are not a matter of public concern."
The state of New York has adopted legislation that prohibits
employers from discriminating against employees on the basis of their
legal political activities, legal use of consumable products, and legal
recreational activities-all off-site, during non-work hours and without
the use of the employer's property. 148 The statute specifically excludes,
however, any activity which "creates a material conflict of interest
related to the employer's trade secrets, proprietary information or other
proprietary or business interest ....
,,149 To date, the majority of cases
dealing with the "recreational activities" portion of the statute have
defined recreational activities as not including romantic relationships or
extramarital affairs, 150 although the Supreme Court, Appellate Division

140.

COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2007).

141. Id. § 24-34-402.5(1)(a).
142. 952 F. Supp. 1458 (D. Colo. 1997).
143. Id. at 1464 (citing § 24-34-402.5(l)(a)).
144. See id. at 1463 (citing § 24-34-402.5(1)(a)).
145. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-51q (2007); see also Pagnattaro, supra note 121, at 669 ("Unlike
the broader state statutes addressing off-duty conduct... [§ 31-51 q] simply protects employees who
exercise certain federal and state constitutional rights from adverse action by their employers.").
146. See, e.g., Daley v. Aetna Life & Cas. Co., 734 A.2d 112, 122 (Conn. 1999) (citing
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983); Schnabel v. Tyler, 646 A.2d 152, 162-63 (Conn.
1994)).
147. Id. at 123 (citations omitted).
148. N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201-d(2)(a)-(c) (McKinney 2002).
149. Id. § 201-d(3)(a).
150. See, e.g., McCavitt v. Swiss Reinsurance Am. Corp., 237 F.3d 166, 168 (2d Cir. 2001)
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has ruled that an employee who was "terminated as a result of a
discussion during recreational activities [dinner at a restaurant] outside
of the workplace in which her political affiliations became an issue,
stated a cause of action for a violation of [§ 201-d].''
North Dakota's statute prohibits discrimination by an employer, in
part, based on an employee's "participation in lawful activity off the
employer's premises during nonworking hours which is not in direct
52
conflict with the essential business-related interests of the employer."'
In the only case interpreting this language, the Supreme Court of North
Dakota ruled it was a disputed issue of fact whether a chaplain who was
discovered engaging in unseemly behavior in a Sears store bathroom
was terminated for participating in lawful activity off the employer's
153
premises during nonworking hours.
As can be seen, even the few states that seem to promise protection
of lawful, off-duty conduct from employment decisions are severely
limited in application. For example, one may have an argument for
protection if information associated with matters of public concern or
politics were used in a hiring decision, but this only applies in
Connecticut or New York. 54 Importantly, all of these statutes also
condition the conduct on not having any connection with the employer's
business concerns. 55 An employer could argue that information derived
about a candidate, from the Internet, had a direct correlation to the
employer's business since it was used in the hiring decision. Henry Ford
reportedly would send investigators to managers' homes to investigate
"the employee's religion, spending and savings patterns, drinking habits

("[N]othing in logic, the language of § 201-d, its legislative history, or New York state case law...
leads us to conclude that the New York Court of Appeals would hold that romantic dating is a
'recreational activity' under ...§ 201-d(l)(b).
...
(citing State v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 621
N.Y.S.2d 158, 159-60 (App. Div. 1995)); Wal-Mart, 621 N.Y.S.2d, at 159-60 (citations omitted)
(finding that "the voluminous legislative history" of § 201-d excluded dating relationships from the

definition of leisure activities).
151. Cavanaugh v. Doherty, 675 N.Y.S.2d 143, 149 (App. Div. 1998) (citations omitted).
152. N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2004).
153. Hougum v. Valley Mem'l Homes, 574 N.W.2d 812, 820-21 (N.D. 1998) (citing N.D.
CENT. CODE § 12.1-20-12.1 (2004) (prohibiting masturbation in public places); § 14-02.4-03).
154. See supranotes 128-47 and accompanying text.
155. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5(1) (2007) ("It shall be a discriminatory or
unfair employment practice for an employer to terminate . . . any employee due to . . . lawful

activity off the premises of the employer during nonworking hours unless such a restriction: (a)
Relates to a bona fide occupational requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the
employment activities and responsibilities of a particular employee or ...group of employees ... or
(b) Is necessary to avoid a conflict of interest with any responsibilities to the employer or the
appearance of such a conflict of interest.").
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and how the worker 'amused himself. ' 156 Today's employer may argue
it has a legitimate business interest in whether its employees are
publishing pictures on the Internet of themselves drinking excessively.
Since current privacy laws will not protect Internet information,
perhaps the "lawful conduct" statutes provide a good start to protect that
information. Many of these statutes are incorporated into states'
antidiscrimination prohibitions. 157 The Internet provides employers the
opportunity to learn a substantial amount of information they would
otherwise be prohibited from asking (such as religion, disability, marital
status) in a typical employment interview. Even if an employee were to
volunteer such information during an interview, the employer is still
prohibited from using it in the hiring decision. 58 But there is no way to
know if an employer has used the same information gleaned from an
Internet search in deciding whether to even interview an applicant.
One way to protect job applicants from the content of their Internet
information would be to amend "lawful conduct" statutes to prohibit
employers from using publicly-available personal information that could
be obtained through an Internet search in their hiring decisions. As an
alternative, or in addition, personal information obtained by employers
through an Internet search could be treated as credit reports. 59 Under
this model, employers could be prohibited from acquiring personal
information that could be obtained through an Internet search without
first informing the applicant in writing, and would be required to inform
the applicant if this information was used as part of an adverse decision,
as well as to provide the applicant with a copy of the information found
and used. This latter requirement would at least inform the applicant
there was possibly damaging information on the Internet so steps could
be taken to remove, alter, or correct the information.
CONCLUSION

Millions of people have embraced the Internet as a means of

156. Stross, supra note 20.
157. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.4-03 (2004) (codifying North Dakota's "lawful
conduct" statute within a section entitled "Employer's discriminatory practices" in Chapter 14-02.4,
entitled "Human Rights," which contains policies addressing several other types of discrimination);
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 27-9-105(a)(iv) (2007) (codifying Wyoming's statute within a section entitled
"Discriminatory and unfair employment practices enumerated; limitations").
158. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), 12112(a)-(b) (2000).
159. See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text (discussing similar restrictions and
procedures for the use of credit reports in employment decisions).
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communication and social interaction. Employers have found this
information to be very helpful in learning more about job applicants. For
the most part, however, people are not publishing information about
themselves on the Internet for prospective employers. Although most of
this information is accessible by anyone with an Internet connection, the
information is usually intended only to be disseminated among a few
individuals. Under current U.S. law, even this "limited" dissemination
destroys any right to privacy in the information, since it can be accessed
by others. 160 In effect, information cannot be kept private unless it is
also kept secret. This eliminates any sort of privacy protection for a fastgrowing form of social communication.
In the late nineteenth century, technological changes drove a need
for updated privacy laws. 16' Early twenty-first century technologies are
doing the same. It takes time for new legal theories to evolve and be
adopted, so no quick fix is in sight. In the meantime, some protection
could be provided by expanding current -state statutes which prohibit
employers from considering off-site, off-work, lawful conduct in hiring
decisions. These statutes could be used (with some amendment, as well
as enactment by the states lacking such statutes) to specifically restrict
the ability of prospective employers from considering information
gleaned from Internet searches. Without such protection, job candidates
may never know that they missed an opportunity to interview for their
dream job because of some questionable comments they shared with
friends through a social networking site.

160. See supra notes 83-99 and accompanying text (discussing the "all or nothing" approach
U.S. law takes to the right to privacy).
161. See, e.g., supra notes 48-56 and accompanying text (discussing the concerns of Warren
and Brandeis over expanding technologies of their time-most notably that of the press-and the
related developing need for privacy protections against public disclosure).
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